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ABSTRACT
Both law enforcement and the military have incorporated the use of open 
source intelligence (OSINT) into their daily operations. Whilst there are 
observable similarities in how these organisations employ OSINT there 
are also diferences between military and policing approaches towards 
the understanding of open source information and the goals for the intel-
ligence gathered from it. In particular, we focus on evaluating potential 
similarities and diferences between understandings and approaches of 
operational OSINT between British law enforcement agencies and UK 
based MoD researchers and investigators. hese observations are gath-
ered towards the aim of increasing interoperability as well as creating 
opportunities for speciic strengths and competencies of particular 
organisational approaches to be shared and utilised by both the military 
and law enforcement.  
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1. INTRODUCTION
he value of intelligence, be it for law enforcement, the military, or busi-
nesses, cannot be understated. Intelligence gives an organisation some 
kind of advantage over another; this might be the vital intelligence that 
solves a crime, enables victory in a battle, or allows a company to return 
a better proit than their rivals. his intelligence may come from a wide 
range of sources: from people who have been interviewed, from inter-
nal data and logs, from crime scene evidence, from videos and imagery, 
from phone calls and communications, and many more besides. One 
intelligence discipline that is attracting more and more attention is open 
source intelligence (OSINT). Fuelled by the near ubiquitous nature of the 
internet and coupled with narcissistic tendencies that have accompanied 
the rise in the use of social media, OSINT has moved into the fore of the 
intelligence gathering disciplines. However, as we will see in this paper 
social media is not the only source of open source intelligence and nor 
does it exist in a vacuum from other intelligence sources. his study is 
built primarily upon a qualitative analysis but also references personal 
communications of interactions between the researchers and key infor-
mants of the military and police OSINT sector.  
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2. DEFINING OSINT
Open Source Intelligence will be shown throughout this paper to be a 
dynamic term that oten consists of contradictory or ambiguous pre-
requisites and thus one single deinition does not exist. A good starting 
point is the deinition provided by the CIA (2010) who make the claim 
that “information does not have to be secret to be valuable” and build on 
this tenet to describe OSINT as public information that can be retrieved 
from:
• he Internet
• Traditional mass media (e.g., television, radio, newspapers, 
magazines)
• Specialised journals, conference proceedings, and think tank 
studies
• Photography 
• Geospatial information (e.g. maps and commercial imagery 
products) 
However, they do not rule out the fact that other open sources may also 
be available as well as clarifying that this data collected from ‘publically 
available’ sources must be used in an ‘intelligence context’ and the col-
lection of the subject data may be performed in an overt manner. 
he Ministry of Defence (2011) in the UK provides a more speciic deini-
tion of OSINT:  “intelligence derived from publicly available information 
that has limited public distribution or access.” In particular, they state 
that OSINT material is especially useful when “exploited by trained ana-
lysts to ensure the intelligence produced is unbiased and free of preju-
dice, open-source material is no less important than protectively marked 
material”. his statement of OSINT being equal to other forms of intel-
ligence is a recurring theme within oicial doctrine around OSINT; 
however, many of these reports also mention that it sometimes can have 
diiculty in being taken seriously. 
Most intelligence domains (HUMINT, SIGINT, IMINT, etc.) have their 
roots in the military and in such a context; OSINT became an accepted 
term around the mid-90s (Steele, 1995). An early example of OSINT 
was the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service (FBIS), which monitored 
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foreign radio broadcasts, transcribed and translated them, beginning in 
1941. In fact, as early as 1947, Allan Dulles (formerly Head of the CIA), 
and at that point working for the Oice of Strategic Services, is reported 
as saying that 80 percent of the required intelligence during peace time 
could potentially be obtained through open sources and more recent 
estimates have continued to ofer the same claim or even higher (Gibson, 
2014). 
he National Police Chiefs Council (NPCC) in the UK also provides two 
similar deinitions of open source (2015). he irst being on what is con-
sidered open source research: 
“the collection, evaluation and analysis of materials from sources 
available to the public, whether on payment or otherwise to use as 
intelligence or evidence within investigation”.
he NPCC then go on to deine open source information as being:
“Open source is deined as publically available information (i.e., any 
member of the public could lawfully obtain the information by request 
or observation). It includes books, newspapers, journals, TV and radio 
broadcasts, newswires, Internet WWW, and newsgroups, mapping, 
imagery, photographs, commercial subscription databases and grey 
literature (conference proceedings and institute reports).
hus we see that the police deinition of open source is somewhat more 
extensive and speciic than what is supplied by the MoD. It could be 
argued that the NPCC deinition is more detailed due to a recent publi-
cation, additionally, following the Snowden and Assange leaks of 2013-
2016 (Kwoka, 2015, p.1387), it may have been of interest to better deine 
online investigation tactics to avoid potential controversy and increase 
public transparency (ISC, 2015, p.6). herefore, because the NPCC dei-
nition is more recent and more developed, yet doesn’t conlict or disagree 
with current UK military practices, this paper will use it as the primary 
deinition of OSINT for subsequent comparisons.   
Descriptions of OSINT, such as those cited from the CIA, MoD, and 
NPCC, characterise the range of deinitions available of OSINT and 
their tendency to be rather broad and nonspeciic. And while there may 
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be areas of agreement within these deinitions and others; it is also clear 
that some of the generic criteria for deining OSINT may be somewhat 
ambiguous. As such there are at least three observable areas of poten-
tial dispute: (1) the use of the term publically available; (2) the extent to 
which the data is collected overtly and covertly; and (3) the requirement 
to practice good cyber-hygiene when conducting open source investiga-
tions. We now consider these points term-by-term. 
Firstly, the phrase ‘publically available’ is open to interpretation. Both 
military and law enforcement oicers may, when authorised, draw upon 
‘open source’ data that a non-service civilian could not gain access to. 
Two such examples include; driver and vehicle registrations (DVLA 
databases) and inancial data including credit ratings and banking pro-
viders (Home Oice Centre for Applied Science and Technology (CAST), 
2016, personal communication, November 2016). Although such data-
bases can be accessed by paying customers, local authorities and police 
organisations this information is not made available to the general pub-
lic. Indeed, there may be some debate as to whether such access to data 
can reasonably be considered ‘open source’. Whilst information stored 
by websites such as 192.com holds personal OSINT data behind ‘pay-
walls’, this is considered to be ‘fair game’ meaning anyone with the inter-
est in purchasing details such as personal addresses, electoral and tele-
coms data may do so. Indeed, other databases, such as those maintained 
by large companies oten host what is known as ‘consented data’; and, 
while such data is only stored when someone gives their consent, the 
extent to which they are made aware of both how this data may be used 
in the future and opportunities to scrub data from these records are not 
expressly advertised.  Arguably, police and military access to DVLA and 
inancial databases are a step beyond ‘paywalls’, wherein the data is not 
available for the wider public under any circumstance.  
Secondly, although many OSINT deinitions describe that the data col-
lection process may be done in an overt manner, in practice it is rarely 
done so (South Yorkshire Police, Digital Media Investigations Oicer, 
2017, personal communication, February 2017). his is especially true 
due to the dominance of the internet both for data storage as well as 
through its convenience to search and locate intelligence through social 
media and other publicly open sites, and while the NPCC deines ive 
levels of open source research, only Level 1 is explicitly termed overt 
research (National Police Chiefs Council, 2015). 
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Social media especially is a mineield because of the personal nature of 
almost all information posted to such sites.  For example, considering 
investigations that operate on Twitter and Facebook, users are not and 
cannot be notiied if their proile content is being reviewed, screen-cap-
tured, directly downloaded by another user or through a specially desig-
nated OSINT sotware product such as Repknight (2017), Echosec (2017) 
and Cosain (2017). Interestingly, such OSINT products market them-
selves speciically for Policing, Home Oice and MoD usage by making 
themselves on the G-Cloud (the UK government’s digital marketplace 
(see e.g., Cosain1 and Palantir2)). 
Historically and internationally, such methods of covert OSINT sur-
veillance may be recognised as early as the 1930’s, in which the afore-
mentioned United States Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service (FBIS) 
(Mercado, 2007) was established to begin monitoring overseas public 
radio frequencies, by 1941 it had begun to turn radio into a primary 
intelligence source during World War II. In a similar manner to the 
investigation methods of the contemporary era, this OSINT was access-
ing publicly available sources through covert technologies with trained 
analysts, the process was invisible to axis powers (Mercado, 2001) in the 
same manner modern social media collection may be undetectable to 
suspect user proiles. 
hirdly, oten not stated is the responsibility of military and law enforce-
ment (when operating at levels 2-5, see below) to act with high levels of 
‘cyber hygiene’, minimising the digital footprint let behind on websites, 
or use services to mask such a presence.  his approach is considered 
to be more of a counter-intelligence measure than clandestine exploita-
tion. Indeed, it is oten necessary to protect the anonymity of investiga-
tors, the organisation as well as the individuals or groups being targeted, 
which may in turn reveal details of the operation. 
Additionally, UK law enforcement have speciic guidance, via the College 
of Policing, detailing the requirements for level 4-5 OSINT investiga-
tions utilising social media account takeovers and covert human intel-
ligence sources (CHIS) to obtain ‘open source’ social media evidence 
1  https://www.digitalmarketplace.service.gov.uk/g-cloud/services/945108024310388 (Cosain)
2  https://www.digitalmarketplace.service.gov.uk/g-cloud/services/388738118169964 (Palantir 
Front Line Policing and Intelligence)
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or intelligence (Cleveland Police, 2014). his may be a particularly con-
tentious issue, due to the high-level covert tactics taken to impersonate 
or iniltrate online sites in the pursuit of data acquisition. hey would 
appear to contradict any overt possibilities of OSINT as well as mas-
sively stretching deinitions of what is deemed ‘publicly available’. As 
such, levels 4-5 of OSINT usually require the highest levels of surveil-
lance authority in place (National Police Chiefs Council, 2015; Home 
Oice, 2014).  hese levels are generically accepted to be:
1. Overt OSINT Investigations/Research
2. Core OSINT Investigation/Research
3. Covert Advanced OSINT Investigation/Research
4. Covert Internet and Networks Investigations
5. Undercover Online/Covert Internet Investigator
Level 5 OSINT deployment is of particular interest, because it appears 
to blur the line between OSINT and covert surveillance and interception 
the most. It is deined as;
“Online covert activity 4.32 he use of the internet may be required 
to gather information prior to and/or during a CHIS operation... the 
CHIS may need to communicate online, for example this may involve 
contacting individuals using social media websites. Whenever a public 
authority intends to use the internet as part of an investigation, they 
must irst consider whether the proposed activity is likely to interfere 
with a person’s Article 8 rights, including the efect of any collateral 
intrusion. Any activity likely to interfere with an individual’s Article 8 
rights should only be used when necessary and proportionate to meet 
the objectives of a speciic case. Where it is considered that private 
information is likely to be obtained, an authorisation (combined or 
separate) must be sought as set out elsewhere in this code.” (National 
Police Chiefs Council, 2015; Home Oice, 2014).
he above three contradictions show that many existing deinitions of 
OSINT are somewhat ambiguous when considering the technical practi-
calities of both contemporary law enforcement and military approaches. 
It may be of interest to explore whether these deinitions are kept delib-
erately vague to allow the optimal access to investigative equipment, tac-
tics and data sources. 
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3. INTEGRATION OF OSINT AS AN 
INTELLIGENCE DISCIPLINE
Despite the military being one of the key proponents of the use of 
OSINT, both from the US and also NATO (who produced the de facto 
OSINT handbook in 2001) the extent to which open source information 
is used in military operations is underreported with, perhaps unsurpris-
ingly, few examples in the public domain. Nevertheless, there are contin-
ued eforts to push forward the use of OSINT in combination with data 
mining techniques as well as text analytics and artiicial intelligence as a 
solution to enhance the capabilities of intelligence analysts. Such analy-
ses are now feasible and, in fact, demanded due to the growing availabil-
ity of real-time and predictive analytics which can utilise information 
from the past and present and use it to predict what may happen in the 
future (McCue, 2014).  
Although OSINT has merits of its own as a single intelligence source, 
particularly in the military domain it can also be used to validate infor-
mation garnered from closed intelligence sources and as such may enable 
the protection of a closed source though obtaining the same information 
from an open one. OSINT can also be utilised as part of an ‘all-source 
analysis’ bringing further credibility to the intelligence as it has been 
veriied through multiple sources (Haigler, 2012). 
In the near future, it is expected that the use of OSINT within the mili-
tary will only increase simply due to the amount of information being 
made available online, the ease with which it can be accessed, the rela-
tively low-cost of obtaining it compared with other intelligence sources 
as well as counteracting the feeling of not being let behind (i.e., everyone 
else is doing it) (Homeland Security Research, 2017)
Due to the UK police’s reliance on OSINT to help provide evidence as well 
as enhance and parallel evidence from other sources, it may be argued as 
to having a greater structure and focus than in the military, partially due 
to the greater reliance on capturing evidence and the requirement for 
such evidence to stand up reliably in court when called upon.
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In many cases, obtaining open source intelligence may be considered a 
form of directed surveillance, when conducted at level two and above 
in the aforementioned levels of open source research. In order to carry 
out such an investigation the police and the speciic case in question is 
authorised via a directed surveillance authority (DSA). Such a permis-
sion may be given by ”... an authorising oicer where he or she believes 
that the authorisation is necessary in the circumstances of the particular 
case on the grounds that it is: (a) in the interests of national security; (b) 
for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime or of preventing disor-
der; (c) in the interests of the economic well-being of the UK; (d) in the 
interests of public safety; (e) for the purpose of protecting public health” 
(Home Oice, 2014)
Such legislation may appear to further muddy the deinitions of OSINT, 
as levels 2+ of OSINT investigative deployment appear to require ‘covert 
surveillance authorities’ to be in place and set the conditions and limita-
tions of the operation (with the exception of imminent threats to life or 
serious bodily harm). his may appear to the wider public as somewhat 
ambiguous for the collection of open or publicly available data, but is spe-
ciically to protect privacy via the means of collection. To ensure that data 
and evidence is captured in the correct open source manner, the JAPAN 
principles are still deemed by law enforcement as a suitable approach for 
OSINT analysts and oicers (Kent Police, 1998). JAPAN is an acronym 
for Justiied, Authorised, Proportionate, Auditable, Necessary; and such 
an approach ensures that the values of the 1998 Human Rights Act are 
preserved (UK Government, 1998), most noticeably (Article 8) privacy, 
and to ensure everyone is treated with fairness and respect. 
Military OSINT operations and intelligence have the beneit of being 
able to work from the UK remotely, assisting in operations across the 
globe. However this still means they are bound by RIPA (Regulation 
of Investigatory Powers Act) (UK Government, 2000) the same as UK 
police forces. here is not necessarily a requirement for the MoD to apply 
RIPA when conducting intelligence operations overseas; however, it is 
MoD policy to apply RIPA to any intelligence operation regardless of 
the country the intelligence is being gathered in citing the fact that ”... 
[RIPA] provides a well-established regulatory framework for such opera-
tions and reduces the chances of improper conduct and abuse” (British 
Army, 2009). Nonetheless, from an outsider’s perspective it is impossible 
to be certain how rigorously this mandate is being applied. 
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Particularly in the world of OSINT the application of RIPA can be prob-
lematic given that online investigations and speciically those on social 
media, which are becoming ever more common, are not suiciently cov-
ered by RIPA (Bartlett et al., 2013) as it was written prior to the mas-
sive SM explosion from 2007 onwards (Digital Trends, 2016).  hus the 
sooner that all legislation can catch up with the growth of technology 
the more protection there will be for those who are utilising OSINT and 
those who are being investigated. 
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4. RELIABILITY OF OSINT 
Open source information, in the UK the policing 5x5x5 grading system, 
tends to never be considered better than E41 Intelligence. E41 stands for 
an untested source, of which the reliability cannot be judged but it can be 
disseminated within the UK Police Service and to other law enforcement 
agencies as speciied (College of Policing, n.d.). 
Open source intelligence, is usually deined as being: “Open sources of 
information are widely available but may not be accurate, reliable or 
valid. he main uses of open-source information are to:
• Develop an understanding of the locations relevant to a piece of 
analysis
• Identify the potential impact of social and demographic changes
• Identify external factors that may impact on crime, disorder and 
community concerns
• Support and develop investigations by indicating lines of enquiry 
or corroborating other information
• Support the development of subject proiles and problem proiles.
here are several factors to take into account when using open-source 
information:
• Access may require the user to register or pay a fee (eg, online news 
media, the electoral roll)
• he use of open-source information should be audited
• he efect of local security policies on access to open-source infor-
mation (eg, some sites are not available to local users)
• It is not subject to the same quality standards as closed sources
• It should be corroborated by supporting information
When accessing open-source information online, a footprint identify-
ing the police address is let on the website. A non-attributable IT iden-
tity is sometimes required to avoid law enforcement being identiied as 
the originator of the enquiry. An accredited covert internet investigator 
should be asked to advise in these instances.” (College of Policing, 2013)
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his is the same for both military and police classiications, whilst OSINT 
is seen as valuable, it is best through ‘paralleling’ or ‘clustering’ tech-
niques. Paralleling is the process of using alternative research/investiga-
tive resources (such as OSINT) to ind exact or associated information 
that has come from a closed source (Donohue, 2015). his is particularly 
useful for preserving the integrity and security of hidden and embedded 
assets, additionally this approach can be used to ind and document a 
chain of evidence from intelligence leads. 
Clustering, is a technique that utilises a collection of strong and, or, weak 
‘signals’ to predict the bigger picture (Lesca and Lesca, 2011). For exam-
ple, when trying to guess the end product of a recipe; the more individual 
ingredients that are learned, the greater the probability of understanding 
the speciic type of cake. OSINT can be particularly useful for feeding 
in big data crawling results to help further validate or expand stronger 
human led analysis. 
Paralleling is not the only use of OSINT though, and while many were 
still sceptical of open source information, the 9/11 attacks brought 
OSINT back to the fore in the military domain, as intelligence managers 
realised that such information could not be easily discounted (Hulnick, 
2010). Post these attacks, researchers were even able to put together a net-
work from open sources of the links between many of the hijackers and 
associates, thus leading to a better understanding of how the hijackers 
communicated and were able to remain undetected for long enough to 
carry out such an atrocity (Krebs, 2002). hus despite the claims over its 
unreliability OSINT has proven itself to be useful not only for validating 
other intelligence, but also as an intelligence source in its own right. he 
onus is on the investigating analyst to have the training, knowledge and 
expertise to accurately assess the OSINT source individually and make 
a reasonable assumption about the reliability of the source on its own 
merits independent of whether it was obtained openly or not.  
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5. DIFFICULTIES AND DISPARITIES DEFINING 
OSINT IN MODERN SECURITY
As previously discussed there is not an accepted deinition of open source 
intelligence be it for law enforcement, the military or elsewhere and even 
within existing deinitions the scope of the material and the means that 
can be used to obtain it are not standardised and varies across difer-
ent practices. his causes issues to new people entering the ield as there 
is no standard reference or accepted form of OSINT. Even established 
books, such as Michael Bazzell’s Open Source Intelligence Techniques 
(2016) include social engineering techniques that may not be considered 
acceptable for LEAs or military usage. 
Law enforcement and the military may also collect OSINT for diferent 
reasons and we are at pains to point out the diference between OSINT 
for digital evidence capture and OSINT for intelligence capture. 
As of June 2017, the UK military do not use the equivalents of CHIS 
or OSINT levels 4-5 in operations deemed open source intelligence or 
research gathering. Some exceptions to this may be 77th Brigade (British 
Army, 2017) who are known to use Facebook, Twitter and other social 
media to engage in non-lethal warfare (MacAskill, 2015). However, as 
a force wide security policy the majority of military OSINT does not 
involve any form of impersonation/engagement or CHIS approaches. 
In gathering SM data, two primary types of proiles may be deployed; 
‘grey man’ and ‘embedded’ accounts. (Nottinghamshire Police Open 
Source Intelligence Investigator, 2016, personal communication, August 
2016). Grey man accounts are necessary to pass through the basic ‘log 
in’ requirements of SM sites such as Facebook, VK and Telegram, allow-
ing the account access to a greater degree of content, than if the inves-
tigator wasn’t registered with the site. hese grey man accounts do not 
‘befriend, follow, or engage’ in any form of communication with other 
proiles, their beneit is to simply pass through SM site login barriers 
to obtain open source content within. his approach is commonly used 
by the MoD and other non-policing governmental actors as they are 
considered to be deployed at OSINT levels 1-2. Beyond this, ‘embedded 
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accounts’ may be used (usually within law enforcement with regards to 
a speciic tasking and a DSA). Such accounts are deliberately presented 
and maintained as genuine users, with friend lists, active statuses, proile 
interests, etc. hese are designed to enable the proile to ‘iniltrate pri-
vate groups inside SM provider sites, or to gain access to suspect proiles 
with a greater degree of security. he speciics of how and to what extend 
such proiles are populated and integrated into social media networks is 
dependent on the localised force policy in the police. 
In using OSINT for investigations both the military and the police have 
to tread a ine line around perception and how this impacts on the pri-
vacy of those who are under investigation. Furthermore, there is a blur-
ring of lines between HUMINT and OSINT (particularly when dealing 
with crowdsourcing intelligence) (Mak et al., 2017). his concern would 
also be present when police or military extrapolate investigations and 
operations to third parties or outside experts. 
here are also wider growing concerns around the expectations of pri-
vacy online ranging from the mantra that online privacy is dead and 
that those who are worried about exposing their personal details should 
just ‘get over it’ to legitimate concerns (Edwards and Urquhart, 2016). 
As the GDPR (General Data Protection Regulation) comes into force 
this also raises concerns around the access and storage of personal data; 
although, there are exceptions around law enforcement. Further confus-
ing the issue are the complications that will arise as the UK looks to leave 
the EU and implements its own legislation away from existing EU law 
(O’Sullivan, 2017). 
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6. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN UK LAW 
ENFORCEMENT AND MOD USE OF OSINT:
6.1 Priorities for counterintelligence and OSINT leakage are diferent 
between the military and police
In UK law enforcement, ACPO (Association of Chief Police Oicers), 
now formally known as the NPCC (National Police Chiefs Council), laid 
a foundation for online and social media privacy standards for police 
staf in their 2013 document: Guidelines on the Safe Use of the Internet 
and Social Media by MDP Oicers (Ministry of Defence Police, 2013), 
oicers are encouraged to use the internet for social media purposes, but 
insist that because information on SM may be made public they ought 
to behave as they would on duty given that “Information placed on the 
Internet or social media could potentially end up in the worldwide public 
domain and be seen or used by someone it was not intended for, even if 
it was intended to be ‘private’ or is on a closed proile or group. It is likely 
that any information placed on the Internet or social media will be con-
sidered to be a public disclosure.” In this document, it is worth noting 
that Section 6 relates to: Safeguarding Personal and Sensitive Data which 
reiterates the requirement for police not being able to leak or disclose 
others’ personal and private data, whilst Section 7 relates directly to pre-
serving the integrity of the police force reputation. 
Section 8, of the same document, is entitled: ‘Keeping your private life 
private’. Due to the potential for criminals and malicious actors to use 
the internet, particularly social media to identify personal information 
about police oicers. hey may be capable of obtaining; ‘embarrass-
ing, discrediting, harassing, corrupting or blackmailing them or their 
families’. herefore the guidance to “Ensure privacy settings for social 
media are set to the highest level, not to register on social media using 
pnn.police.uk e-mail addresses, to be careful when accepting ‘friends’ to 
access their social media, not to be associated with inappropriate mate-
rial on ‘friends’ social media, not to be associated with social media of 
criminals and not to be  associated with the social media of persons 
involved in serious organised crime.” are issued to all oicers governing 
their use of social media overall, (Derbyshire Police, 2012). 
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Furthermore, oicer are encouraged not to post online speciic details 
such as employer, job post, hobbies and locations frequented, images 
in uniform, mobile numbers and email addresses, vehicle and home 
addresses, family member details, etc.  Additionally; “It is also recom-
mended that police oicers who may wish to pursue duties in covert 
policing carefully consider whether the publication of personal images 
and information on social media may restrict their future career oppor-
tunities in such areas on the grounds of personal safety, public safety and 
operational security.”
he MoD has published similar standards in the; ‘Online Engagement 
Standards’ document of 2009 (Ministry of Defence, 2009).  his docu-
ment covers the same areas as UK law enforcement, however arguably 
with greater detail and is stricter with organisational and operational 
data security. Military personnel are encouraged to never speak as if they 
are doing so on behalf of their organisation without oversight from a 
senior commanding oicer. Additionally, they should avoid publishing 
material that:
• Relates to operations or deployments
• Ofers opinions on wider Defence and Armed Forces activity, or on 
third parties without their permission
• Attempt to speak, or could be interpreted as speaking, on behalf of 
your Service or the MoD
• Relates to controversial, sensitive or political matters
Additionally, it is advised that; “Such online presences provide an oppor-
tunity for Service and MoD civilian personnel to explain their work. 
But they also carry risks to individuals, to their Service and to Defence. 
Service and MoD civilian personnel are already using online presences 
and Defence information is entering the public domain unoicially. 
Guidelines are therefore required.” his shows that there is a greater 
emphasis on security due to the increased security risks to individual 
personnel, the wider organisation, as well as in the data itself - which 
may be used by belligerent nations with a far greater skillset than the 
average ‘criminal organisation’. Such personal data may give away oper-
ational and tactical intelligence such as vehicles and munitions, coor-
dinates, time and date, movements, number of associates, ranks and 
specialisations. 
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Such data has recently been observed being publicised by journalists and 
military analysts relating to alleged Russian involvement in the Crimea. 
Indeed, the Russian soldier; Alexander Sotkin, nicknamed ‘Sergeant 
Selie’, was ridiculed and criticised for seemingly leaking his geoloca-
tion and interior of his armoured signals vehicle publicly on Instagram 
(Gallagher, 2014). Although there is some debate as to the whether the 
geolocation (which appears to show activity across the border in Ukraine) 
is accurate, but nonetheless the incident caused a degree of international 
controversy, additionally with the individual in question being allegedly 
stripped of his rank as sergeant. Further social media embarrassments 
have been reported against U.S military families who received fake 
orders to leave South Korea. US Army counterintelligence are investigat-
ing the incidents of late September 2017 in which fake social media and 
mobile alerts were sent out; “warning American military families and 
Defense Department personnel of orders to evacuate the volatile penin-
sula” (Lamothe, 2017).
In the UK, armed forces are able to operate closed social media groups, 
such as restricted, private Facebook groups to inform family members 
about a group’s well-being when oversees on campaigns with little inter-
net connectivity, or, with a high level of secrecy involved (Royal Navy, 
2017). It is likely such SM groups are the target of belligerent states for 
espionage and sabotage such as in the case of Alexander Sotkin’s data 
leakage and the South Korean military family’s hoax. Such incidents 
are taken very seriously from a military point of view as they may hint 
towards serious counterintelligence vulnerabilities, allowing for manip-
ulation, espionage and disinformation campaigns to work efectively 
against operations, personnel and even target family members.
6.2 Usage of the Dark Web
As of  early 2017, open source investigation sectors of the military did 
not oicially classify the Dark Web as an ‘open source’ resource (Pattar, 
2017), this decision is currently paralleled elsewhere the HMRC who 
also usually operate at open source levels 1-2 and do not access dark 
web URLs. Whilst this is in part due to security and infrastructure con-
straints, it has been recognised to be somewhat problematic and will 
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likely change in the foreseeable future. In particular OSINT investiga-
tors within the military may recognise the wealth of potential to investi-
gate Dark Markets for associations towards funding terrorist groups and 
other foreign threats (Weiman, 2016). 
It may be argued that the priorities of open source access to the dark 
web are diferent between the UK military and law enforcement agen-
cies. In addition to terrorist, enemy state and other foreign concerns, UK 
police operations focus on leading priorities such as; child sexual exploi-
tation (CSE), drug traicking, online fraud and scamming communities, 
money laundering and various other organised criminal network forums 
and dark marketplaces (Buxton and Bingham, 2015; Home Oice, 2017). 
Particularly, the strong focus on ighting CSE has encouraged an essen-
tial need for police oicers and analysts to operate on the dark web as 
clariied by the HMIC (Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary) in 
2017: “he dark net provides abusers with a means of distributing indecent 
images of children around the globe to those who share their interest. It has 
provided an opportunity for such ofending to be undertaken more widely. 
It has made the job of the police service and other agencies responsible for 
safeguarding children more diicult.” he perceived anonymity, capacity 
to mask IP addresses and geolocation, as well as the diiculty of search-
ing and penetrating dark net ‘friend circles’ has made it essential for law 
enforcement to pursue suspects and ofenders on Tor and similar dark 
web browsers.   
Further surrounding the topic of OSINT and CSE; a particular area of 
growing controversy and debate in the UK is for law enforcement deal-
ing with such E41/Hearsay intelligence from the rise in popularity of 
‘paedophile hunter’ vigilante groups such as; Guardians of the North 
(2017), he Hunted One (2017) and Dark Justice (2017). Such groups oten 
impersonate underage children upon social media sites, but also utilise 
mobile messaging and dating applications such as Kik, Badoo, Snapchat, 
and WhatsApp.. he majority of paedophile hunter ‘stings’ utilise the 
described OSINT investigation levels 4 and 5. Indeed, the actions of pae-
dophile hunter groups amount to OSINT SM account takeovers as well 
as online CHIS, these are carried out without a DSA or legal authori-
sation and provided to law enforcement. Whilst the police may make 
use of such intelligence and use paralleling techniques to capture their 
own evidence, this approach has come under signiicant criticism, both 
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internally within the force as well as externally for encouraging ‘vigilan-
tism’ and dangerous practices with little or no concern for suspects to be 
mistaken, entrapped and publicised from amateur and possibly fallible 
investigative techniques (Perraudin, 2017).
Such concerns are not observably present in the media concerning mili-
tary intelligence measures, nor are they likely to be treated with as much 
concern as law enforcement does. his is primarily due to the military’s 
‘foreign facing’ scope, (with the exception of national security threats 
such as terrorism), it is likely that such E41 intelligence obtained from 
a similar process about military interests would be treated as valuable, 
or at least worth researching or investigating further. Indeed, there exist 
many amateur OSINT online publications of interest to the MoD, some 
examples being bloggers that record and report on the movements of 
battleships near their coastal homes, journalists who carry out OSINT 
research into topics such as the aforementioned Russian military move-
ments, but also into the analysis of publications and propaganda mate-
rial of terrorist groups (e.g., Bellingcat, 2017). 
he comparative reduction of the UK judicial systems involvement in 
the military collecting of intelligence for operational and tactical usage 
allows them a greater degree of freedom than having to pursue a chain 
of evidence for suspect conviction. Furthermore, this may in turn reduce 
the manual workload required by investigating and authorising oicers 
and analysts.        
6.3 Utilisation of External Advisors and Support 
UK law enforcement oten draws upon OSINT services through advice 
and direction from the Home Oice’s Centre of Applied Science and 
Technology (CAST). Products such as Cosain, Repknight and Echosec 
are listed through Home Oice vetting and recommendations on an 
online ‘portal’ (CAST, 2017). Of these products, the majority are com-
mercially engineered by the private sector as external developers, some 
of which are available for additional public and private workplaces. 
It has also been shown that law enforcement may get locked into cer-
tain products (e.g., Palantir) and there are concerns about background 
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information sharing that are barely acceptable at a law enforcement level 
but could be disastrous for a military operation, thus the tools utilised 
by the military must be carefully scrutinised before deployment (Harris, 
2017).  
While the military do make use of of-the-shelf tools they also utilise 
work with organisations to develop OSINT tools customised bespokely 
for military usage and are usually locked into being only available for 
them. he military ensures the signing of strict NDAs as well as secrecy 
agreements, the individuals developing products go through alpha and 
beta stages on site at military bases. Individuals working on them exter-
nally are usually required to have DV vetting (Ministry of Defence, 2017). 
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7. BENEFITS OF SHARING BEST PRACTICES 
BETWEEN DEFENCE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT
With regards to OSINT, law enforcement and the military oten operate 
in the same space, utilising many of the same tools and techniques and 
thus may beneit from the experience of sharing best practices 
7.1 Increased interoperability
With the future merger of the Home Oice and MoD (DSTL) (Home 
Oice, 2017b) it is likely in the future that the two organisations will 
increase their areas of overlap and collaboration on joint operations and 
intelligence sharing exercises. herefore it would be beneicial to increase 
the resilience and capacity of both parties if feasible. Increasing interop-
erability of OSINT investigations and research towards a compat-
ible system would allow for greater collaboration on overlapping areas. 
For example, considering concerns such as domestic terrorist threats, 
increased interoperability could in the case of OSINT, lead to increased 
police capability to parallel military intelligence, but more importantly, 
enhanced military procedures to investigate and research threats in a 
manner compatible with policing ‘chain of evidence concerns’.
7.2 Enhanced rigour and chain of custody
It may be beneicial for military operations to begin a best practice of 
treating intelligence sources in a similar manner as the police do for 
evidence gathered on OSINT investigations. his includes protection of 
data (hashing), integrity of data in case it is needed as evidence or even to 
be posted publicly in case of criticism. Increasingly we are seeing media 
channels belonging to opposing nations utilising news reports in a nega-
tive propaganda fashion. Examples such as ‘Russia Today’ attempts to 
demoralise and criticise the UK and US through social, political and 
military reports (O’Sullivan, 2014; Johnson, 2016). herefore, as all 
aspects of military and law enforcement are fair game for open criti-
cism, it may be beneicial for military OSINT investigations and research 
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to embrace the evidence capture and auditing standards of the police 
force, perhaps embracing the JAPAN principles, this would provide fair 
justiication of a reasonable and proportionate use of OSINT that would 
minimise the damage of triggering privacy and other human rights crit-
icisms. Furthermore, by considering policing standards, there may be 
subsequent improvements in reviewing and managing open source ana-
lysts and researchers, particularly as good or bad intelligence leads could 
be traced back along the chain of evidence audit. 
7.3  Improving security, personal and organisational counterintelligence 
standards
he contemporary digital age results in increasingly complex and stren-
uous taskings for counterintelligence military and security services. 
Whilst this is naturally a greater concern of the MoD, it may represent a 
best practice that the law enforcement may consider a horizon challenge 
to embrace today (Lord, 2015). Indeed, the high standards of conidenti-
ality and security regarding counter intelligence and data leakage from 
the military perspective certainly aren’t neglected or ignored by police 
guidance and best practices. However, there are notable diferences with 
the inclusion of the media, particularly for documentaries and enter-
tainment television, which seek to detail and even challenge state sur-
veillance technologies (Channel 4, 2016). Such documentaries can be 
argued to enhance the police-public relationship through awareness 
and education in the interest of fostering greater communication and 
collaboration. his is perhaps a convenience the military does not need 
considering OSINT, as the UK public are rarely the subject of its inves-
tigations and operations. herefore, this may allow a greater degree of 
secrecy for military analysts ‘training, techniques and tactics’ for locat-
ing and exploiting OSINT. It may be of value for the preservation of both 
military and policing open source practices to discuss, limit or reduce 
the number of law enforcement documentaries if they are deemed to be 
compromising valuable; tools, exploits and tactics.
As mentioned earlier in the MoD OSINT deinition, there is a great 
emphasis on utilising trained analysts to optimise the usefulness and 
beneits of OSINT; “to ensure the intelligence produced is unbiased and 
106
PROCEEDINGS • XVI • 2017 • FROM RESEARCH TO SECURITY UNION
free of prejudice” (Ministry of Defence, 2011). Furthermore, the mili-
tary place a great emphasis on developing OSINT tools and technologies 
in-house, this ensures that they have an immediate input to the devel-
opment of open source products through Alpha and Beta development 
stages, as well as close contact to product contractors for quick and ei-
cient training and sotware updates and patches.  
7.4 Development of OSINT standardisation 
Currently, diferent UK police forces apply diferent rules and best prac-
tices for the collection of data prior to achieving a DSA under RIPA 
(West Yorkshire Police Analyst 2017, personal communication 12 May). 
Some allow for a ‘once over’ single check of a proile, whereas others allow 
for up to, but no more than 3 looks at a unique proile (Sorinteq, 2017). 
Additionally, depending on the senior investigating oicer (SIO) difer-
ent approaches may be taken to acquire, or to work around a DSA (such 
as utilising a NOD, non-operational directive or getting a retrospective 
DSA). Whilst both the military and the College of Policing provide their 
own internal OSINT training packages, there are also a vast number of 
third party providers of OSINT training who are able to train both mili-
tary and law enforcement in advanced open source analysis. 
Much of the individual police oicer and military analyst actions on 
an investigation or OSINT research job are dependent on the SIO (or 
Commanding Oicer) leading the case, as well as upon the conditions 
speciied in the Directed Surveillance Authority. As a result of this, 
OSINT investigative techniques, tools used, and working methodolo-
gies may be shared between diferent groups. It may be beneicial in the 
future to establish a wider set of standards and best practices that not 
only diferent military or individual police forces could use, but may also 
be used between military and law enforcement interchangeably. 
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion, UK police and military open source investigations from 
within the UK have a great deal of similarities; this is particularly due to 
them both being under the governance of RIPA (2000). However, there 
are several observable diferences between the two organisations.
he irst observable diference is in the handling of a chain of evidence 
between the two bodies. UK police forces oten have to prioritise and 
integrate a chain of custody for any intelligence that may lead to pros-
ecution or to be shown in a court of law. herefore, the police tend to 
have a more structured and detailed approach to evidence gathering, 
for example following the JAPAN approach, that ensures intelligence is 
either processed or paralleled into a secure, auditable and useful format. 
As noted, the military may beneit somewhat from a similar system that 
could protect data integrity from public criticisms, as well as leading to 
greater management of researcher and analyst eicacy. Additionally, the 
military hold a greater capacity to act on E41 intelligence provided to 
them from external and untested sources, they face a lesser degree of 
public insight and subsequently potential criticism. 
Secondly, there are noticeable diferences between the use of third party 
sotware and developers. he UK MoD prioritise the use of bespoke 
sotware tools and in-house training solutions, oten requiring DV 
security vetting for contractors to work on site and in association with 
them. Alternatively, law enforcement have traditionally used a variety of 
commercial and private sector solutions, some of which are speciically 
designed for police OSINT, however these are not developed with the 
same degree of bespoke and internal design. 
hirdly, there are diferences with organisational approaches towards 
the dark web. As stated, currently the MoD have a far more cautious 
approach to operating on the dark web. As detailed, UK law enforcement 
have faced both pressure and necessity to operate in this domain, partic-
ularly due to police speciic concerns such as online child sexual exploi-
tation. It is likely however in the near future that the military will include 
the dark web as part of their open source domain. herefore, it may be 
beneicial for the MoD to discuss merging best practices and standards 
that have been nurtured by contemporary policing approaches. 
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Additionally, there are slight observable diferences between the military 
and policing structures in regards to counterintelligence. he MoD pro-
vide slightly stricter guidelines, particularly revolving around operational 
security, as such they also ofer closed SM groups to provide direct infor-
mation to families of serving members when they are restricted or not able 
to use SM personally. Furthermore, the military faces greater challenges 
of preserving intelligence from belligerent states as well as protecting its 
personnel and families from a higher severity of threat. As stated earlier, 
such concerns include disinformation campaigns which have been used 
internationally to disrupt and displace personnel and families. 
Overall there are clearly more overlaps and similarities than diferences. 
he observable diferences are deined by either the relationship to judi-
ciary and prosecution services, or through the severity of the risk and 
security level they operate at. 
his document serves as a brief overview of observable diferences between 
UK military and policing OSINT practices. A more in depth and detailed 
review would be ideal for formulating how, or why, these diferences have 
occurred. In particular, envisioned next steps for future research may 
include; irstly identifying the extent of operational and tactical difer-
ences between the two organisations, and secondly; building a roadmap 
for mapping potential compatible best practices that may lead to greater 
interoperability (particularly when considering counter terrorism), organ-
isational eiciency (primarily for military auditing and evidence capture), 
increased capability (such as military dark web best practices), and greater 
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